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INTRODUCTION
The idea of public reason, as I understand it,' belongs to a
conception of a well ordered constitutional democratic society.
The form and content of this reason-the way it is understood by
citizens and how it interprets their political relationship-is part
of the idea of democracy itself. This is because a basic feature of
democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism-the fact that a
t Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University. This essay is a revision of a
lecture given at The University of Chicago Law School in November 1993. I should like to
thank Joshua Cohen, Erin Kelly, Percy Lehning, Michael Perry, Margaret Rawls, and
T.M. Scanlon for their great help and advice in writing this paper. Throughout they have
given me numerous suggestions, which I have gladly accepted. Above all, to Burton Dre-
ben I am especially indebted: as so often before, he has been generous beyond measure in
his efforts; in every section he has helped me reorganize and reshape the text, giving it a
clarity and simplicity it would not otherwise have had. Without their constant advice and
encouragement, and that of others mentioned below, I never could have completed the
revisions of my original lecture.
1 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture VI, § 8.5 (Columbia paperback ed
1996). References to Political Liberalism are given by lecture and section; page numbers
are also provided unless the reference refers to an entire lecture, section, or subsection.
Note that the 1996 paperback edition of Political Liberalism contains a new second intro-
duction which, among other things, tries to make clearer certain aspects of political liber-
alism. Section 5 of this introduction, id at 1-1vii, discusses the idea of public reason and
sketches several changes I now make in affirming this idea. These are all followed and
elaborated in what is presented here and are important to a complete understanding of
the argument. Note also that the pagination of the paperback edition is the same as the
original.
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plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines,' re-
ligious, philosophical, and moral, is the normal result of its cul-
ture of free institutions.' Citizens realize that they cannot reach
agreement or even approach mutual understanding on the basis
of their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines. In view of this,
they need to consider what kinds of reasons they may reasonably
give one another when fundamental political questions are at
stake. I propose that in public reason comprehensive doctrines of
truth or right be replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable
addressed to citizens as citizens.4
Central to the idea of public reason is that it neither criti-
cizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonre-
ligious, except insofar as that doctrine is incompatible with the
essentials of public reason and a democratic polity. The basic re-
quirement is that a reasonable doctrine accepts a constitutional
democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law.
While democratic societies will differ in the specific doctrines
that are influential and active within them-as they differ in the
western democracies of Europe and the United States, Israel,
and India-finding a suitable idea of public reason is a concern
that faces them all.
§ 1: THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON
1. The idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the
basic moral and political values that are to determine a constitu-
tional democratic government's relation to its citizens and their
relation to one another. In short, it concerns how the political
relation is to be understood. Those who reject constitutional de-
mocracy with its criterion of reciprocity' will of course reject the
very idea of public reason. For them the political relation may be
that of friend or foe, to those of a particular religious or secular
community or those who are not; or it may be a relentless strug-
gle to win the world for the whole truth. Political liberalism does
2 I shall use the term doctrine for comprehensive views of all kinds and the term con-
ception for a political conception and its component parts, such as the conception of the
person as citizen. The term idea is used as a general term and may refer to either as the
context determines.
' Of course, every society also contains numerous unreasonable doctrines. Yet in this
essay I am concerned with an ideal normative conception of democratic government, that
is, with the conduct of its reasonable citizens and the principles they follow, assuming
them to be dominant and controlling. How far unreasonable doctrines are active and tol-
erated is to be determined by the principles of justice and the kinds of actions they per-
mit. See § 7.2.
See § 6.2.
See § 1.2.
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not engage those who think this way. The zeal to embody the
whole truth in politics is incompatible with an idea of public rea-
son that belongs with democratic citizenship.
The idea of public reason has a definite structure, and if one
or more of its aspects are ignored it can seem implausible, as it
does when applied to the background culture.6 It has five differ-
ent aspects: (1) the fundamental political questions to which it
applies; (2) the persons to whom it applies (government officials
and candidates for public office); (3) its content as given by a
family of reasonable political conceptions of justice; (4) the appli-
cation of these conceptions in discussions of coercive norms to be
enacted in the form of legitimate law for a democratic people; and
(5) citizens' checking that the principles derived from their con-
ceptions of justice satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.
Moreover, such reason is public in three ways: as the reason
of free and equal citizens, it is the reason of the public; its subject
is the public good concerning questions of fundamental political
justice, which questions are of two kinds, constitutional essen-
tials and matters of basic justice;7 and its nature and content are
public, being expressed in public reasoning by a family of reason-
able conceptions of political justice reasonably thought to satisfy
the criterion of reciprocity.
It is imperative to realize that the idea of public reason does
not apply to all political discussions of fundamental questions,
but only to discussions of those questions in what I refer to as the
public political forum.' This forum may be divided into three
parts: the discourse of judges in their decisions, and especially of
the judges of a supreme court; the discourse of government offi-
cials, especially chief executives and legislators; and finally, the
discourse of candidates for public office and their campaign man-
agers, especially in their public oratory, party platforms, and po-
litical statements? We need this three-part division because, as I
note later, the idea of public reason does not apply in the same
6 See text accompanying notes 12-15.
These questions are described in Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture VI, § 5 at 227-
30 (cited in note 1). Constitutional essentials concern questions about what political
rights and liberties, say, may reasonably be included in a written constitution, when as-
suming the constitution may be interpreted by a supreme court, or some similar body.
Matters of basic justice relate to the basic structure of society and so would concern ques-
tions of basic economic and social justice and other things not covered by a constitution.
' There is no settled meaning of this term. The one I use is not I think peculiar.
Here we face the question of where to draw the line between candidates and those
who manage their campaigns and other politically engaged citizens generally. We settle
this matter by making candidates and those who run their campaigns responsible for
what is said and done on the candidates' behalf.
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The University of Chicago Law Review
way in these three cases and elsewhere.'" In discussing what I
call the wide view of public political culture," we shall see that
the idea of public reason applies more strictly to judges than to
others, but that the requirements of public justification for that
reason are always the same.
Distinct and separate from this three-part public political fo-
rum is what I call the background culture. 2 This is the culture of
civil society. In a democracy, this culture is not, of course, guided
by any one central idea or principle, whether political or relig-
ious. Its many and diverse agencies and associations with their
internal life reside within a framework of law that ensures the
familiar liberties of thought and speech, and the right of free as-
sociation." The idea of public reason does not apply to the back-
ground culture with its many forms of nonpublic reason nor to
media of any kind.'4 Sometimes those who appear to reject the
idea of public reason actually mean to assert the need for full and
open discussion in the background culture. 5 With this political
liberalism fully agrees.
Finally, distinct from the idea of public reason, as set out by
the five features above, is the ideal of public reason. This ideal is
realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, legislators, chief execu-
10 Often writers on this topic use terms that do not distinguish the parts of public dis-
cussion, for example, such terms as "the public square," "the public forum," and the like. I
follow Kent Greenawalt in thinking a finer division is necessary. See Kent Greenawalt,
Religious Convictions and Political Choice 226-27 (Oxford 1988) (describing, for example,
the differences between a religious leader's preaching or promoting a pro-life organization
and leading a major political movement or running for political office).
See § 4.
Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture I, § 2.3 at 14 (cited in note 1).
The background culture includes, then, the culture of churches and associations of
all kinds, and institutions of learning at all levels, especially universities and professional
schools, scientific and other societies. In addition, the nonpublic political culture mediates
between the public political culture and the background culture. This comprises media-
properly so named--of all kinds: newspapers, reviews and magazines, TV and radio, and
much else. Compare these divisions with Habermas's account of the public sphere. See
Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture IX, § 1.3 at 382 n 13 (cited in note 1).
See id, lecture VI, § 3 at 220-22.
See David Hollenbach, S.J., Civil Society: Beyond the Public-Private Dichotomy, 5
The Responsive Community 15 (Winter 1994/95). For example, he says:
Conversation and argument about the common good will not occur initially in the
legislature or in the political sphere (narrowly conceived as the domain in which in-
terests and power are adjudicated). Rather it will develop freely in those components
of civil society that are the primary bearers of cultural meaning and value-
universities, religious communities, the world of the arts, and serious journalism. It
can occur wherever thoughtful men and women bring their beliefs on the meaning of
the good life into intelligent and critical encounter with understandings of this good
held by other peoples with other traditions. In short, it occurs wherever education
about and serious inquiry into the meaning of the good life takes place.
Id at 22.
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tives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for
public office, act from and follow the idea of public reason and
explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamen-
tal political positions in terms of the political conception of justice
they regard as the most reasonable. In this way they fulfill what
I shall call their duty of civility to one another and to other citi-
zens. Hence, whether judges, legislators, and chief executives act
from and follow public reason is continually shown in their
speech and conduct on a daily basis.
How though is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens
who are not government officials? In a representative govern-
ment citizens vote for representatives-chief executives, legisla-
tors, and the like-and not for particular laws (except at a state
or local level when they may vote directly on referenda questions,
which are rarely fundamental questions). To answer this ques-
tion, we say that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if
they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, sup-
ported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity,
they would think it most reasonable to enact. 6 When firm and
widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as
ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and can-
didates for public office who violate public reason, is one of the
political and social roots of democracy, and is vital to its enduring
strength and vigor. 7 Thus citizens fulfill their duty of civility and
support the idea of public reason by doing what they can to hold
government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights
and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is
not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with
freedom of speech.
2. 1 now turn to a discussion of what I have labeled the third,
fourth, and fifth aspects of public reason. The idea of public rea-
son arises from a conception of democratic citizenship in a consti-
tutional democracy. This fundamental political relation of citi-
zenship has two special features: first, it is a relation of citizens
within the basic structure of society, a structure we enter only by
birth and exit only by death; 8 and second, it is a relation of free
" There is some resemblance between this criterion and Kant's principle of the origi-
nal contract. See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals: Metaphysical First Princi-
ples of the Doctrine of Right §§ 47-49 at 92-95 (AK 6:315-18) (Cambridge 1996) (Mary
Gregor, trans and ed); Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in
Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice,' Part II, in Kant: Political Writings 73-87 (AK 8:
289-306) (Cambridge 2d ed 1991) (Hans Reiss, ed, H.B. Nisbet, trans).
17 See also § 4.2.
Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture I, § 2.1 at 12 (cited in note 1). For concerns
about exiting only by death, see id, lecture IV, § 1.2 at 136 n 4.
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and equal citizens who exercise ultimate political power as a col-
lective body. These two features immediately give rise to the
question of how, when constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice are at stake, citizens so related can be bound to
honor the structure of their constitutional democratic regime and
abide by the statutes and laws enacted under it. The fact of rea-
sonable pluralism raises this question all the more sharply, since
it means that the differences between citizens arising from their
comprehensive doctrines, religious and nonreligious, may be ir-
reconcilable. By what ideals and principles, then, are citizens
who share equally in ultimate political power to exercise that
power so that each can reasonably justify his or her political de-
cisions to everyone?
To answer this question we say: Citizens are reasonable
when, viewing one another as free and equal in a system of social
cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one an-
other fair terms of cooperation according to what they consider
the most reasonable conception of political justice; and when they
agree to act on those terms, even at the cost of their own inter-
ests in particular situations, provided that other citizens also ac-
cept those terms. The criterion of reciprocity requires that when
those terms are proposed as the most reasonable terms of fair co-
operation, those proposing them must also think it at least rea-
sonable for others to accept them, as free and equal citizens, and
not as dominated or manipulated, or under the pressure of an in-
ferior political or social position.19 Citizens will of course differ as
to which conceptions of political justice they think the most rea-
sonable, but they will agree that all are reasonable, even if barely
SO.
Thus when, on a constitutional essential or matter of basic
justice, all appropriate government officials act from and follow
public reason, and when all reasonable citizens think of them-
selves ideally as if they were legislators following public reason,
the legal enactment expressing the opinion of the majority is le-
gitimate law. It may not be thought the most reasonable, or the
most appropriate, by each, but it is politically (morally) binding
on him or her as a citizen and is to be accepted as such. Each
thinks that all have spoken and voted at least reasonably, and
19 The idea of reciprocity has an important place in Amy Gutmann and Dennis
Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement chs 1-2 and passim (Belknap 1996). However,
the meaning and setting of our views are not the same. Public reason in political liberal-
ism is purely political, although political values are intrinsically moral, whereas Gut-
mann and Thompson's account is more general and seems to work from a comprehensive
doctrine.
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therefore all have followed public reason and honored their duty
of civility.
Hence the idea of political legitimacy based on the criterion
of reciprocity says: Our exercise of political power is proper only
when we sincerely believe that the reasons we would offer for our
political actions-were we to state them as government offi-
cials-are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other
citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons. This crite-
rion applies on two levels: one is to the constitutional structure
itself, the other is to particular statutes and laws enacted in ac-
cordance with that structure. To be reasonable, political concep-
tions must justify only constitutions that satisfy this principle.
To make more explicit the role of the criterion of reciprocity
as expressed in public reason, note that its role is to specify the
nature of the political relation in a constitutional democratic re-
gime as one of civic friendship. For this criterion, when govern-
ment officers act from it in their public reasoning and other citi-
zens support it, shapes the form of their fundamental institu-
tions. For example-I cite an easy case-if we argue that the re-
ligious liberty of some citizens is to be denied, we must give them
reasons they can not only understand-as Servetus could under-
stand why Calvin wanted to burn him at the stake-but reasons
we might reasonably expect that they, as free and equal citizens,
might reasonably also accept. The criterion of reciprocity is nor-
mally violated whenever basic liberties are denied. For what rea-
sons can both satisfy the criterion of reciprocity and justify de-
nying to some persons religious liberty, holding others as slaves,
imposing a property qualification on the right to vote, or denying
the right of suffrage to women?
Since the idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level
the basic political values and specifies how the political relation
is to be understood, those who believe that fundamental political
questions should be decided by what they regard as the best rea-
sons according to their own idea of the whole truth-including
their religious or secular comprehensive doctrine-and not by
reasons that might be shared by all citizens as free and equal,
will of course reject the idea of public reason. Political liberalism
views this insistence on the whole truth in politics as incompati-
ble with democratic citizenship and the idea of legitimate law.
3. Democracy has a long history, from its beginning in classi-
cal Greece down to the present day, and there are many different
ideas of democracy." Here I am concerned only with a well or-
" For a useful historical survey see David Held, Models of Democracy (Stanford 2d ed
19971
The University of Chicago Law Review
dered constitutional democracy-a term I used at the outset-
understood also as a deliberative democracy. The definitive idea
for deliberative democracy is the idea of deliberation itself. When
citizens deliberate, they exchange views and debate their sup-
porting reasons concerning public political questions. They sup-
pose that their political opinions may be revised by discussion
with other citizens; and therefore these opinions are not simply a
fixed outcome of their existing private or nonpolitical interests. It
is at this point that public reason is crucial, for it characterizes
such citizens' reasoning concerning constitutional essentials and
matters of basic justice. While I cannot fully discuss the nature of
deliberative democracy here, I note a few key points to indicate
the wider place and role of public reason.
There are three essential elements of deliberative democ-
racy. One is an idea of public reason,2 although not all such
ideas are the same. A second is a framework of constitutional
democratic institutions that specifies the setting for deliberative
legislative bodies. The third is the knowledge and desire on the
part of citizens generally to follow public reason and to realize its
ideal in their political conduct. Immediate implications of these
essentials are the public financing of elections, and the providing
for public occasions of orderly and serious discussion of funda-
mental questions and issues of public policy. Public deliberation
must be made possible, recognized as a basic feature of democ-
racy, and set free from the curse of money." Otherwise politics is
dominated by corporate and other organized interests who
1997). Held's numerous models cover the period from the ancient polis to the present
time and he concludes by asking what democracy should mean today. In between he con-
siders the several forms of classical republicanism and classical liberalism, as well as
Schumpeter's conception of competitive elite democracy. Some figures discussed include
Plato and Aristotle; Marsilius of Padua and Machiavelli; Hobbes and Madison; Bentham,
James Mill and J. S. Mill; Marx with socialism and communism. These are paired with
schematized models of the characteristic institutions and their roles.
2 Deliberative democracy limits the reasons citizens may give in supporting their po-
litical opinions to reasons consistent with their seeing other citizens as equals. See
Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in Alan Hamlin and Philip Petit,
eds, The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State 17, 21, 24 (Basil Blackwell 1989);
Review Symposium on Democracy and Its Critics, 53 J Pol 215, 223-24 (1991) (comments
of Joshua Cohen); Joshua Cohen, Democracy and Liberty 13-17 (manuscript on file with U
Chi L Rev), in Jon Elster, ed, Deliberative Democracy (forthcoming 1997).
' Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of American Politics, NY Rev Books 19 (Oct 17, 1996)
(describing why "money is the biggest threat to the democratic process"). Dworkin also
argues forcefully against the grave error of the Supreme Court in Buckley v Valeo, 424
US 1 (1976). Dworkin, NY Rev Books at 21-24. See also Rawls, Political Liberalism, lec-
ture VIII, § 12 at 359-63 (cited in note 1) (Buckley is "dismaying" and raises the risk of
"repeating the mistake of the Lochner era.").
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through large contributions to campaigns distort if not preclude
public discussion and deliberation.
Deliberative democracy also recognizes that without wide-
spread education in the basic aspects of constitutional democratic
government for all citizens, and without a public informed about
pressing problems, crucial political and social decisions simply
cannot be made. Even should farsighted political leaders wish to
make sound changes and reforms, they cannot convince a misin-
formed and cynical public to accept and follow them. For exam-
ple, there are sensible proposals for what should be done re-
garding the alleged coming crisis in Social Security: slow down
the growth of benefits levels, gradually raise the retirement age,
impose limits on expensive terminal medical care that prolongs
life for only a few weeks or days, and finally, raise taxes now,
rather than face large increases later.' But as things are, those
who follow the "great game of politics" know that none of these
sensible proposals will be accepted. The same story can be told
about the importance of support for international institutions
(such as the United Nations), foreign aid properly spent, and
concern for human rights at home and abroad. In constant pur-
suit of money to finance campaigns, the political system is simply
unable to function. Its deliberative powers are paralyzed.
§ 2: THE CONTENT OF PUBLIC REASON
1. A citizen engages in public reason, then, when he or she
deliberates within a framework of what he or she sincerely re-
gards as the most reasonable political conception of justice, a
conception that expresses political values that others, as free and
equal citizens might also reasonably be expected reasonably to
endorse. Each of us must have principles and guidelines to which
we appeal in such a way that this criterion is satisfied. I have
proposed that one way to identify those political principles and
guidelines is to show that they would be agreed to in what in
Political Liberalism is called the original position.24 Others will
think that different ways to identify these principles are more
reasonable.
Thus, the content of public reason is given by a family of po-
litical conceptions of justice, and not by a single one. There are
' Paul Krugman, Demographics and Destiny, NY Times Book Rev 12 (Oct 20, 1996),
reviewing and describing proposals in Peter G. Peterson, Will America Grow Up Before It
Grows Old? How the Coming Social Security Crisis Threatens You, Your Family, and
Your Country (Random House 1996), and Charles R. Morris, The AARP: America's Most
Powerful Lobby and the Clash of Generations (Times Books 1996).
4 Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture I, § 4 at 22-28 (cited in note 1).
1997]
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many liberalisms and related views, and therefore many forms of
public reason specified by a family of reasonable political concep-
tions. Of these, justice as fairness, whatever its merits, is but
one. The limiting feature of these forms is the criterion of reci-
procity, viewed as applied between free and equal citizens, them-
selves seen as reasonable and rational. Three main features
characterize these conceptions:
First, a list of certain basic rights, liberties, and opportuni-
ties (such as those familiar from constitutional regimes);
Second, an assignment of special priority to those rights, lib-
erties, and opportunities, especially with respect to the
claims of the general good and perfectionist values; and
Third, measures ensuring for all citizens adequate all-
purpose means to make effective use of their freedoms."
Each of these liberalisms endorses the underlying ideas of
citizens as free and equal persons and of society as a fair system
of cooperation over time. Yet since these ideas can be interpreted
in various ways, we get different formulations of the principles of
justice and different contents of public reason. Political concep-
tions differ also in how they order, or balance, political principles
and values even when they specify the same ones. I assume also
that these liberalisms contain substantive principles of justice,
and hence cover more than procedural justice. They are required
to specify the religious liberties and freedoms of artistic expres-
sion of equal citizens, as well as substantive ideas of fairness in-
volving fair opportunity and ensuring adequate all-purpose
means, and much else."
Political liberalism, then, does not try to fix public reason
once and for all in the form of one favored political conception of
justice. 7 That would not be a sensible approach. For instance,
political liberalism also admits Habermas's discourse conception
' Here I follow the definition in Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture I, § 1.2 at 6, lec-
ture IV, § 5.3 at 156-57 (cited in note 1).
' Some may think the fact of reasonable pluralism means the only forms of fair adju-
dication between comprehensive doctrines must be only procedural and not substantive.
This view is forcefully argued by Stuart Hampshire in Innocence and Experience (Harvard
1989). In the text above, however, I assume the several forms of liberalism are each sub-
stantive conceptions. For a thorough treatment of these issues, see the discussion in
Joshua Cohen, Pluralism and Proceduralism, 69 Chi Kent L Rev 589 (1994).
' I do think that justice as fairness has a certain special place in the family of politi-
cal conceptions, as I suggest in Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture IV, § 7.4 (cited in note
1). But this opinion of mine is not basic to the ideas of political liberalism and public rea-
son.
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of legitimacy (sometimes said to be radically democratic rather
than liberal),28 as well as Catholic views of the common good and
solidarity when they are expressed in terms of political values.29
Even if relatively few conceptions come to dominate over time,
and one conception even appears to have a special central place,
the forms of permissible public reason are always several.
Moreover, new variations may be proposed from time to time and
older ones may cease to be represented. It is important that this
be so; otherwise the claims of groups or interests arising from so-
cial change might be repressed and fail to gain their appropriate
political voice.3"
2. We must distinguish public reason from what is some-
times referred to as secular reason and secular values. These are
not the same as public reason. For I define secular reason as rea-
soning in terms of comprehensive nonreligious doctrines. Such
doctrines and values are much too broad to serve the purposes of
public reason. Political values are not moral doctrines,3 however
available or accessible these may be to our reason and common
sense reflection. Moral doctrines are on a level with religion and
' See Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse
Theory of Law and Democracy 107-09 (MIT 1996) (William Rehg, trans) (defining the dis-
course principle). Seyla Benhabib in her discussion of models of public space in Situating
the Self- Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Routledge
1992), says that: "The discourse model is the only one which is compatible both with the
general social trends of our societies and with the emancipatory aspirations of new social
movements like the women's movement." Id at 113.'She has previously considered
Arendt's agonistic conception, as Benhabib calls it, and that of political liberalism. But I
find it hard to distinguish her view from that of a form of political liberalism and public
reason, since it turns out that she means by the public sphere what Habermas does,
namely what Political Liberalism calls the background culture of civil society in which
the ideal of public reason does not apply. Hence political liberalism is not limiting in the
way she thinks. Also, Benhabib does not try to show, so far as I can see, that certain prin-
ciples of right and justice belonging to the content of public reason could not be inter-
preted to deal with the problems raised by the women's movement. I doubt that this can
be done. The same holds for Benhabib's earlier remarks in Seyla Benhabib, Liberal Dia-
logue Versus a Critical Theory of Discursive Legitimation, in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed,
Liberalism and the Moral Life 143, 154-56 (Harvard 1989), in which the problems of the
women's movement were discussed in a similar way.
Deriving from Aristotle and St. Thomas, the idea of the common good is essential to
much of Catholic moral and political thought. See, for example, John Finnis, Natural Law
and Natural Rights 153-56, 160 (Clarendon 1980); Jacques Maritain, Man and the State
108-14 (Chicago 1951). Finnis is especially clear, while Aquinas is occasionally ambigu-
ous.
Thus, Jeremy Waldron's criticism of political liberalism as not allowing new and
changing conceptions of political justice is incorrect. See Jeremy Waldron, Religious Con-
tributions in Public Deliberation, 30 San Diego L Rev 817, 837-38 (1993). See the reply to
Waldron's criticisms in Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 Loyola LA L Rev
1459, 1460 (1996) ("[G]eneral acceptance of a liberal ideal of public reason would permit
the robust evolution of political discourse.").
3 See note 2 for my definition of doctrine.
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first philosophy. By contrast, liberal political principles and val-
ues, although intrinsically moral values, are specified by liberal
political conceptions of justice and fall under the category of the
political. These political conceptions have three features:
First, their principles apply to basic political and social in-
stitutions (the basic structure of society);
Second, they can be presented independently from compre-
hensive doctrines of any kind (although they may, of course,
be supported by a reasonable overlapping consensus of such
doctrines); and
Finally, they can be worked out from fundamental ideas
seen as implicit in the public political culture of a constitu-
tional regime, such as the conceptions of citizens as free and
equal persons, and of society as a fair system of cooperation.
Thus, the content of public reason is given by the principles
and values of the family of liberal political conceptions of justice
meeting these conditions. To engage in public reason is to appeal
to one of these political conceptions-to their ideals and princi-
ples, standards and values-when debating fundamental politi-
cal questions. This requirement still allows us to introduce into
political discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine, re-
ligious or nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give
properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our
comprehensive doctrine is said to support. I refer to this re-
quirement as the proviso, and consider it in detail below.2
A feature of public reasoning, then, is that it proceeds en-
tirely within a political conception of justice. Examples of politi-
cal values include those mentioned in the preamble to the United
States Constitution: a more perfect union, justice, domestic tran-
quillity, the common defense, the general welfare, and the
blessings of liberty for ourselves and our posterity. These include
under them other values: so, for example, under justice we also
have equal basic liberties, equality of opportunity, ideals con-
cerning the distribution of income and taxation, and much else.
The political values of public reason are distinct from other
values in that they are realized in and characterize political in-
stitutions. This does not mean that analogous values cannot
characterize other social forms. The values of effectiveness and
efficiency may characterize the social organization of teams and
clubs, as well as the political institutions of the basic structure of
See § 4.
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society. But a value is properly political only when the social
form is itself political: when it is realized, say, in parts of the ba-
sic structure and its political and social institutions. It follows
that many political conceptions are nonliberal, including those of
aristocracy and corporate oligarchy, and of autocracy and dicta-
torship. All of these fall within the category of the political.3 We,
however, are concerned only with those political conceptions that
are reasonable for a constitutional democratic regime, and as the
preceding paragraphs make clear, these are the ideals and prin-
ciples expressed by reasonable liberal political conceptions.
3. Another essential feature of public reason is that its po-
litical conceptions should be complete. This means that each con-
ception should express principles, standards, and ideals, along
with guidelines of inquiry, such that the values specified by it
can be suitably ordered or otherwise united so that those values
alone give a reasonable answer to all, or to nearly all, questions
involving constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice.
Here the ordering of values is made in the light of their structure
and features within the political conception itself, and not pri-
marily from how they occur within citizens' comprehensive doc-
trines. Political values are not to be ordered by viewing them
separately and detached from one another or from any definite
context. They are not puppets manipulated from behind the
scenes by comprehensive doctrines.34 The ordering is not dis-
torted by those doctrines provided that public reason sees the or-
dering as reasonable. And public reason can indeed see an or-
dering of political values as reasonable (or unreasonable), since
institutional structures are open to view and mistakes and gaps
within the political ordering will become exposed. Thus, we may
be confident that the ordering of political values is not distorted
by particular reasonable comprehensive doctrines. (I emphasize
that the only criterion of distortion is that the ordering of politi-
cal values be itself unreasonable.)
The significance of completeness lies in the fact that unless a
political conception is complete, it is not an adequate framework
of thought in the light of which the discussion of fundamental
political questions can be carried out. 5 What we cannot do in
Here see Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture IX, § 1.1 at 374-75 (cited in note 1).
This thought I owe to Peter de Marneffe.
Note here that different political conceptions of justice will represent different in-
terpretations of the constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. There are also
different interpretations of the same conception, since its concepts and values may be
taken in different ways. There is not, then, a sharp line between where a political concep-
tion ends and its interpretation begins, nor need there be. All the same, a conception
greatly limits its possible interpretations, otherwise discussion and argument could not
1997]
The University of Chicago Law Review
public reason is to proceed directly from our comprehensive doc-
trine, or a part thereof, to one or several political principles and
values, and the particular institutions they support. Instead, we
are required first to work to the basic ideas of a complete political
conception and from there to elaborate its principles and ideals,
and to use the arguments they provide. Otherwise public reason
allows arguments that are too immediate and fragmentary.
4. I now note several examples of political principles and
values to illustrate the more specific content of public reason,
and particularly the various ways in which the criterion of reci-
procity is both applicable and subject to violation.
(a) As a first example, consider the value of autonomy. It
may take two forms: one is political autonomy, the legal inde-
pendence and assured integrity of citizens and their sharing
equally with others in the exercise of political power; the other is
purely moral and characterizes a certain way of life and reflec-
tion, critically examining our deepest ends and ideals, as in Mill's
ideal of individuality." Whatever we may think of autonomy as a
purely moral value, it fails to satisfy, given reasonable pluralism,
the constraint of reciprocity, as many citizens, for example, those
holding certain religious doctrines, may reject it. Thus moral
autonomy is not a political value, whereas political autonomy is.
(b) As a second example, consider the familiar story of the
Good Samaritan. Are the values appealed to properly political
values and not simply religious or philosophical values? While
the wide view of public political culture allows us, in making a
proposal, to introduce the Gospel story, public reason requires us
to justify our proposal in terms of proper political values."
(c) As a third example, consider appeals to desert in dis-
cussing the fair distribution of income: people are wont to say
proceed. For example, a constitution declaring the freedom of religion, including the free-
dom to affirm no religion, along with the separation of church and state, may appear to
leave open the question whether church schools may receive public funds, and if so, in
what way. The difference here might be seen as how to interpret the same political con-
ception, one interpretation allowing public funds, the other not; or alternatively, as the
difference between two political conceptions. In the absence of particulars, it does not
matter which we call it. The important point is that since the content of public reason is a
family of political conceptions, that content admits the interpretations we may need. It is
not as if we were stuck with a fixed conception, much less with one interpretation of it.
This is a comment on Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons 113-20
(Oxford 1995), where Political Liberalism is said to have difficulty dealing with the prob-
lem of determining the interpretation of political conceptions.
' John Stuart Mill, On Liberty ch 3 % 1-9 (1859), in 18 Collected Works of John Stu-
art Mill 260-75 (Toronto 1977) (John M. Robson, ed).
' See § 4.1 on the proviso and the example of citing the Gospel story. For a detailed
consideration of the wide view of public political culture, see generally § 4.
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that ideally distribution should be in accordance with desert.
What sense of desert do they have in mind? Do they mean that
persons in various offices should have the requisite qualifica-
tions-judges must be qualified to judge-and all should have a
fair opportunity to qualify themselves for favored positions? That
is indeed a political value. But distribution in accordance with
moral desert, where this means the moral worth of character, all
things considered, and including comprehensive doctrines, is not.
It is not a feasible political and social ain.
(d) Finally, consider the state's interest in the family and
human life. How should the political value invoked be specified
correctly? Traditionally it has been specified very broadly. But in
a democratic regime the government's legitimate interest is that
public law and policy should support and regulate, in an ordered
way, the institutions needed to reproduce political society over
time. These include the family (in a form that is just), arrange-
ments for rearing and educating children, and institutions of
public health generally. This ordered support and regulation
rests on political principles and values, since political society is
regarded as existing in perpetuity and so as maintaining itself
and its institutions and culture over generations. Given this in-
terest, the government would appear to have no interest in the
particular form of family life, or of relations among the sexes, ex-
cept insofar as that form or those relations in some way affect
the orderly reproduction of society over time. Thus, appeals to
monogamy as such, or against same-sex marriages, as within the
government's legitimate interest in the family, would reflect re-
ligious or comprehensive moral doctrines. Accordingly, that in-
terest would appear improperly specified. Of course, there may
be other political values in the light of which such a specification
would pass muster: for example, if monogamy were necessary for
the equality of women, or same-sex marriages destructive to the
raising and educating of children."
5. The four examples bring out a contrast to what I have
above called secular reason. 9 A view often expressed is that
while religious reasons and sectarian doctrines should not be in-
voked to justify legislation in a democratic society, sound secular
arguments may be.4" But what is a secular argument? Some
:' Of course, I don't here attempt to decide the question, since we are concerned only
with the kinds of reasons and considerations that public reasoning involves.
See § 2.2.
"See Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Soci-
ety, 30 San Diego L Rev 677 (1993). Here Audi defines a secular reason as follows: "A
secular reason is roughly one whose normative force does not evidentially depend on the
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think of any argument that is reflective and critical, publicly in-
telligible and rational, as a secular argument; and they discuss
various such arguments for considering, say, homosexual rela-
tions unworthy or degrading.4' Of course, some of these argu-
ments may be reflective and rational secular ones (as so defined).
Nevertheless, a central feature of political liberalism is that it
views all such arguments the same way it views religious ones,
and therefore these secular philosophical doctrines do not pro-
vide public reasons. Secular concepts and reasoning of this kind
belong to first philosophy and moral doctrine, and fall outside of
the domain of the political.
Thus, in considering whether to make homosexual relations
between citizens criminal offenses, the question is not whether
those relations are precluded by a worthy idea of full human good
as characterized by a sound philosophical and nonreligious view,
nor whether those of religious faith regard it as sin, but primar-
ily whether legislative statutes forbidding those relations in-
fringe the civil rights of free and equal democratic citizens.42 This
question calls for a reasonable political conception of justice
specifying those civil rights, which are always a matter of consti-
tutional essentials.
§ 3: RELIGION AND PUBLIC REASON IN DEMOCRACY
1. Before examining the idea of the wide view of public po-
litical culture, we ask: How is it possible for those holding relig-
ious doctrines, some based on religious authority, for example,
the Church or the Bible, to hold at the same time a reasonable
political conception that supports a reasonable constitutional
democratic regime? Can these doctrines still be compatible for
the right reasons with a liberal political conception? To attain
this compatibility, it is not sufficient that these doctrines accept
a democratic government merely as a modus vivendi. Referring
to citizens holding religious doctrines as citizens of faith we ask:
existence of God or on theological considerations, or on the pronouncements of a person or
institution qua religious authority." Id at 692. This definition is ambiguous between
secular reasons in the sense of a nonreligious comprehensive doctrine and in the sense of
a purely political conception within the content of public reason. Depending on which is
meant, Audi's view that secular reasons must also be given along with religious reasons
might have a role similar to what I call the proviso in § 4.1.
" See the discussion by Michael Perry of John Finnis's argument, which denies that
such relations are compatible with human good. Religion in Politics: Constitutional and
Moral Perspectives ch 3 at 85-86 (Oxford 1997).
"Here I follow T.M. Scanlon's view in The Difficulty of Tolerance, in David Heyd, ed,
Toleration: An Elusive Virtue 226 (Princeton 1996). While the whole is instructive, § 3 at
230-33 is especially relevant here.
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How is it possible for citizens of faith to be wholehearted mem-
bers of a democratic society who endorse society's intrinsic politi-
cal ideals and values and do not simply acquiesce in the balance
of political and social forces? Expressed more sharply: How is it
possible-or is it-for those of faith, as well as the nonreligious
(secular), to endorse a constitutional regime even when their
comprehensive doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed
may decline? This last question brings out anew the significance
of the idea of legitimacy and public reason's role in determining
legitimate law.
To clarify the question, consider two examples. The first is
that of Catholics and Protestants in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries when the principle of toleration was honored
only as a modus vivendi." This meant that should either party
fully gain its way it would impose its own religious doctrine as
the sole admissible faith. A society in which many faiths all
share this attitude and assume that for the indefinite future
their relative numbers will stay roughly the same might well
have a constitution resembling that of the United States, fully
protecting the religious liberties of sharply divided religions more
or less equal in political power. The constitution is, as it were,
honored as a pact to maintain civil peace.' In this society politi-
cal issues might be discussed in terms of political ideas and val-
ues so as not to open religious conflict and arouse sectarian hos-
tility. The role of public reason here serves merely to quiet divi-
siveness and encourage social stability. However, in this case we
do not have stability for the right reasons, that is, as secured by
a firm allegiance to a democratic society's political (moral) ideals
and values.
Nor again do we have stability for the right reasons in the
second example-a democratic society where citizens accept as
political (moral) principles the substantive constitutional clauses
that ensure religious, political, and civil liberties, when their al-
legiance to these constitutional principles is so limited that none
is willing to see his or her religious or nonreligious doctrine los-
ing ground in influence and numbers, and such citizens are pre-
pared to resist or to disobey laws that they think undermine
their positions. And they do this even though the full range of re-
ligious and other liberties is always maintained and the doctrine
,3 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture IV, § 3.4 at 148 (cited in note 1).
"See Kent Greenawalt's example of the society of Diverse Fervent Believers in
Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons at 16-18, 21-22 (cited in note 35).
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in question is completely secure. Here again democracy is ac-
cepted conditionally and not for the right reasons.
What these examples have in common is that society is di-
vided into separate groups, each of which has its own fundamen-
tal interest distinct from and opposed to the interests of the other
groups and for which it is prepared to resist or to violate legiti-
mate democratic law. In the first example, it is the interest of a
religion in establishing its hegemony, while in the second, it is
the doctrine's fundamental interest in maintaining a certain de-
gree of success and influence for its own view, either religious or
nonreligious. While a constitutional regime can fully ensure
rights and liberties for all permissible doctrines, and therefore
protect our freedom and security, a democracy necessarily re-
quires that, as one equal citizen among others, each of us accept
the obligations of legitimate law.45 While no one is expected to
put his or her religious or nonreligious doctrine in danger, we
must each give up forever the hope of changing the constitution
so as to establish our religion's hegemony, or of qualifying our
obligations so as to ensure its influence and success. To retain
such hopes and aims would be inconsistent with the idea of equal
basic liberties for all free and equal citizens.
2. To expand on what we asked earlier: How is it possible-
or is it-for those of faith, as well as the nonreligious (secular), to
endorse a constitutional regime even when their comprehensive
doctrines may not prosper under it, and indeed may decline?
Here the answer lies in the religious or nonreligious doctrine's
understanding and accepting that, except by endorsing a reason-
able constitutional democracy, there is no other way fairly to en-
sure the liberty of its adherents consistent with the equal liber-
ties of other reasonable free and equal citizens. In endorsing a
constitutional democratic regime, a religious doctrine may say
that such are the limits God sets to our liberty; a nonreligious
doctrine will express itself otherwise.46 But in either case, these
See Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture V, § 6 at 195-200 (cited in note 1).
An example of how a religion may do this is the following. Abdullahi Ahmed An-
Na'im, in his book Toward an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and
International Law 52-57 (Syracuse 1990), introduces the idea of reconsidering the tradi-
tional interpretation of Shari'a, which for Muslims is divine law. For his interpretation to
be accepted by Muslims, it must be presented as the correct and superior interpretation
of Shari'a. The basic idea of An-Na'im's interpretation, following the late Sudanese author
Ustadh Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, is that the traditional understanding of Shari'a has
been based on the teachings of the later Medina period of Muhammad, whereas the
teachings of the earlier Mecca period of Muhammad are the eternal and fundamental
message of Islam. An-Na'im claims that the superior Mecca teachings and principles were
rejected in favor of the more realistic and practical (in a seventh-century historical con-
text) Medina teachings because society was not yet ready for their implementation. Now
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doctrines formulate in different ways how liberty of conscience
and the principle of toleration can cohere with equal justice for
all citizens in a reasonable democratic society. Thus, the princi-
ples of toleration and liberty of conscience must have an essential
place in any constitutional democratic conception. They lay down
the fundamental basis to be accepted by all citizens as fair and
regulative of the rivalry between doctrines.
Observe here that there are two ideas of toleration. One is
purely political, being expressed in terms of the rights and duties
protecting religious liberty in accordance with a reasonable po-
litical conception of justice. The other is not purely political but
expressed from within a religious or a nonreligious doctrine, as
when, for example, it was said above that such are the limits God
sets on our liberty. Saying this offers an example of what I call
reasoning from conjecture." In this case we reason from what we
believe, or conjecture, may be other people's basic doctrines, re-
ligious or philosophical, and seek to show them that, despite
what they might think, they can still endorse a reasonable politi-
cal conception of justice. We are not ourselves asserting that
ground of toleration but offering it as one they could assert con-
sistent with their comprehensive doctrines.
§ 4: THE WIDE VIEW OF PUBLIC POLITICAL CULTURE
1. Now we consider what I call the wide view of public politi-
cal culture and discuss two aspects of it. The first is that reason-
able comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, may be
that historical conditions have changed, An-Na'im believes that Muslims should follow
the earlier Mecca period in interpreting Shari'a. So interpreted, he says that Shari'a sup-
ports constitutional democracy. Id at 69-100.
In particular, the earlier Mecca interpretation of Shari'a supports equality of men and
women, and complete freedom of choice in matters of faith and religion, both of which are
in accordance with the constitutional principle of equality before the law. An-Na'in
writes:
The Qur'an does not mention constitutionalism, but human rational thinking and
experience have shown that constitutionalism is necessary for realizing the just and
good society prescribed by the Qur'an.
An Islamic justification and support for constitutionalism is important and relevant
for Muslims. Non-Muslims may have their own secular or other justifications. As
long as all are agreed on the principle and specific rules of constitutionalism, in-
cluding complete equality and non-discrimination on grounds of gender or religion,
each may have his or her own reasons for coming to that agreement.
Id at 100. (This is a perfect example of overlapping consensus.) I thank Akeel Bilgrami for
informing me of An-Na'im's work. I also owe thanks to Roy Mottahedeh for valuable dis-
cussion.
' See § 4.3.
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introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided
that in due course proper political reasons-and not reasons
given solely by comprehensive doctrines-are presented that are
sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines in-
troduced are said to support. This injunction to present proper
political reasons I refer to as the proviso, and it specifies public
political culture as distinct from the background culture." The
second aspect I consider is that there may be positive reasons for
introducing comprehensive doctrines into public political discus-
sion. I take up these two aspects in turn.
Obviously, many questions may be raised about how to sat-
isfy the proviso.49 One is: when does it need to be satisfied? On
the same day or some later day? Also, on whom does the obliga-
tion to honor it fall? It is important that it be clear and estab-
lished that the proviso is to be appropriately satisfied in good
faith. Yet the details about how to satisfy this proviso must be
worked out in practice and cannot feasibly be governed by a clear
family of rules given in advance. How they work out is deter-
mined by the nature of the public political culture and calls for
good sense and understanding. It is important also to observe
that the introduction into public political culture of religious and
secular doctrines, provided the proviso is met, does not change
the nature and content of justification in public reason itself.
This justification is still given in terms of a family of reasonable
political conceptions of justice. However, there are no restrictions
or requirements on how religious or secular doctrines are them-
selves to be expressed; these doctrines need not, for example, be
by some standards logically correct, or open to rational appraisal,
or evidentially supportable."0 Whether they are or not is a matter
to be decided by those presenting them, and how they want what
they say to be taken. They will normally have practical reasons
for wanting to make their views acceptable to a broader audi-
ence.
2. Citizens' mutual knowledge of one another's religious and
nonreligious doctrines expressed in the wide view of public politi-
cal culture"' recognizes that the roots of democratic citizens' alle-
giance to their political conceptions lie in their respective com-
"Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture I, § 2.3 at 13-14 (cited in note 1) (contrasting
public political culture with background culture).
I am indebted here to valuable discussion with Dennis Thompson.
Greenawalt discusses Franklin Gamwell and Michael Perry, who do evidently im-
pose such constraints on how religion is to be presented. See Greenawalt, Private Con-
sciences and Public Reasons at 85-95 (cited in note 35).
" Again, as always, in distinction from the background culture, where I emphasize
there are no restrictions.
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prehensive doctrines, both religious and nonreligious. In this way
citizens' allegiance to the democratic ideal of public reason is
strengthened for the right reasons. We may think of the reason-
able comprehensive doctrines that support society's reasonable
political conceptions as those conceptions' vital social basis, giv-
ing them enduring strength and vigor. When these doctrines ac-
cept the proviso and only then come into political debate, the
commitment to constitutional democracy is publicly manifested.52
Made aware of this commitment, government officials and citi-
zens are more willing to honor the duty of civility, and their fol-
lowing the ideal of public reason helps foster the kind of society
that ideal exemplifies. These benefits of the mutual knowledge of
citizens' recognizing one another's reasonable comprehensive
doctrines bring out a positive ground for introducing such doc-
trines, which is not merely a defensive ground, as if their intru-
sion into public discussion were inevitable in any case.
Consider, for example, a highly contested political issue-the
issue of public support for church schools." Those on different
sides are likely to come to doubt one another's allegiance to basic
constitutional and political values. It is wise, then, for all sides to
introduce their comprehensive doctrines, whether religious or
secular, so as to open the way for them to explain to one another
how their views do indeed support those basic political values.
Consider also the Abolitionists and those in the Civil Rights
Movement.' The proviso was fulfilled in their cases, however
Political liberalism is sometimes criticized for not itself developing accounts of
these social roots of democracy and setting out the formation of its religious and other
supports. Yet political liberalism does recognize these social roots and stresses their im-
portance. Obviously the political conceptions of toleration and freedom of religion would
be impossible in a society in which religious freedom were not honored and cherished.
Thus, political liberalism agrees with David Hollenbach, S.J., when he writes:
Not the least important of [the transformations brought about by Aquinas] was his
insistence that the political life of a people is not the highest realization of the good
of which they are capable-an insight that lies at the root of constitutional theories
of limited government. And though the Church resisted the liberal discovery of mod-
ern freedoms through much of the modern period, liberalism has been transforming
Catholicism once again through the last half of our own century. The memory of
these events in social and intellectual history as well as the experience of the Catho-
lic Church since the Second Vatican Council leads me to hope that communities
holding different visions of the good life can get somewhere if they are willing to risk
conversation and argument about these visions.
David Hollenbach, S.J., Contexts of the Political Role of Religion: Civil Society and Cul-
ture, 30 San Diego L Rev 877, 891 (1993). While a conception of public reason must rec-
ognize the significance of these social roots of constitutional democracy and note how they
strengthen its vital institutions, it need not itself undertake a study of these matters. For
the need to consider this point I am indebted to Paul Weithman.
See Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture VI, § 8.2 at 248-49 (cited in note 1).
See id, lecture VI, § 8.3 at 249-51. I do not know whether the Abolitionists and King
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much they emphasized the religious roots of their doctrines, be-
cause these doctrines supported basic constitutional values-as
they themselves asserted-and so supported reasonable concep-
tions of political justice.
3. Public reasoning aims for public justification. We appeal
to political conceptions of justice, and to ascertainable evidence
and facts open to public view, in order to reach conclusions about
what we think are the most reasonable political institutions and
policies. Public justification is not simply valid reasoning, but ar-
gument addressed to others: it proceeds correctly from premises
we accept and think others could reasonably accept to conclu-
sions we think they could also reasonably accept. This meets the
duty of civility, since in due course the proviso is satisfied.
There are two other forms of discourse that may also be
mentioned, though neither expresses a form of public reasoning.
One is declaration: here we each declare our own comprehensive
doctrine, religious or nonreligious. This we do not expect others
to share. Rather, each of us shows how, from our own doctrines,
we can and do endorse a reasonable public political conception of
justice with its principles and ideals. The aim of doing this is to
declare to others who affirm different comprehensive doctrines
that we also each endorse a reasonable political conception be-
longing to the family of reasonable such conceptions. On the wide
view, citizens of faith who cite the Gospel parable of the Good
Samaritan do not stop there, but go on to give a public justifica-
tion for this parable's conclusions in terms of political values.55 In
this way citizens who hold different doctrines are reassured, and
this strengthens the ties of civic friendship. 6
The second form is conjecture, defined thus: we argue from
what we believe, or conjecture, are other people's basic doctrines,
religious or secular, and try to show them that, despite what they
might think, they can still endorse a reasonable political concep-
tion that can provide a basis for public reasons. The ideal of pub-
thought of themselves as fulfilling the purpose of the proviso. But whether they did or
not, they could have. And had they known and accepted the idea of public reason, they
would have. I thank Paul Weithman for this point.
' Luke 10:29-37. It is easy to see how the Gospel story could be used to support the
imperfect moral duty of mutual aid, as found, say, in Kant's fourth example in the Grun-
dlegung. See Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals AK 4:423, in
Mary Gregor, trans, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge 1996). To formulate a suitable ex-
ample in terms of political values only, consider a variant of the difference principle or of
some other analogous idea. The principle could be seen as giving a special concern for the
poor, as in the Catholic social doctrine. See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 13 (Belknap
1971) (defining the difference principle).
' For the relevance of this form of discourse I am indebted to discussion with Charles
Larmore.
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lic reason is thereby strengthened. However, it is important that
conjecture be sincere and not manipulative. We must openly ex-
plain our intentions and state that we do not assert the premises
from which we argue, but that we proceed as we do to clear up
what we take to be a misunderstanding on others' part, and per-
haps equally on ours. 7
§ 5: ON THE FAMILY AS PART OF TE BASIC STRUCTURE
1. To illustrate further the use and scope of public reason, I
shall now consider a range of questions about a single institution,
the family.5" I do this by using a particular political conception of
justice and looking at the role that it assigns to the family in the
basic structure of society. Since the content of public reason is
determined by all the reasonable political conceptions that sat-
isfy the criterion of reciprocity, the range of questions about the
family covered by this political conception will indicate the ample
space for debate and argument comprehended by public reason
as a whole.
" I will mention another form of discourse that I call witnessing: it typically occurs in
an ideal, politically well ordered, and fully just society in which all votes are the result of
citizens' voting in accordance with their most reasonable conception of political justice.
Nevertheless, it may happen that some citizens feel they must express their principled
dissent from existing institutions, policies, or enacted legislation. I assume that Quakers
accept constitutional democracy and abide by its legitimate law, yet at the same time may
reasonably express the religious basis of their pacifism. (The parallel case of Catholic op-
position to abortion is mentioned in § 6.1.) Yet witnessing differs from civil disobedience
in that it does not appeal to principles and values of a (liberal) political conception of jus-
tice. While on the whole these citizens endorse reasonable political conceptions of justice
supporting a constitutional democratic society, in this case they nevertheless feel they
must not only let other citizens know the deep basis of their strong opposition but must
also bear witness to their faith by doing so. At the same time, those bearing witness ac-
cept the idea of public reason. While they may think the outcome of a vote on which all
reasonable citizens have conscientiously followed public reason to be incorrect or not true,
they nevertheless recognize it as legitimate law and accept the obligation not to violate it.
In such a society there is strictly speaking no case for civil disobedience and conscientious
refusal. The latter requires what I have called a nearly just, but not fully just, society.
See Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 55 (cited in note 55).
" I have thought that J.S. Mill's landmark The Subjection of Women (1869), in 21 Col-
lected Works of John Stuart Mill 259 (cited in note 36), made clear that a decent liberal
conception of justice (including what I called justice as fairness) implied equal justice for
women as well as men. Admittedly, A Theory of Justice should have been more explicit
about this, but that was a fault of mine and not of political liberalism itself. I have been
encouraged to think that a liberal account of equal justice for women is viable by Susan
Moller Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (Basic Books 1989); Linda C. McClain,
"Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence, 65 S Cal
L Rev 1171 (1992); Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford forthcoming 1998)
(a collection of her essays from 1990 to 1996, including The Feminist Critique of Liberal-
ism, her Oxford Amnesty Lecture for 1996); and Sharon A. Lloyd, Situating a Feminist
Criticism of John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28 Loyola LA L Rev 1319 (1995). I have
gained greatly from their writings.
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The family is part of the basic structure, since one of its
main roles is to be the basis of the orderly production and repro-
duction of society and its culture from one generation to the next.
Political society is always regarded as a scheme of social coopera-
tion over time indefinitely; the idea of a future time when its af-
fairs are to be concluded and society disbanded is foreign to the
conception of political society. Thus, reproductive labor is socially
necessary labor. Accepting this, a central role of the family is to
arrange in a reasonable and effective way the raising of and car-
ing for children, ensuring their moral development and education
into the wider culture.59 Citizens must have a sense of justice and
the political virtues that support political and social institutions.
The family must ensure the nurturing and development of such
citizens in appropriate numbers to maintain an enduring soci-
ety.60
These requirements limit all arrangements of the basic
structure, including efforts to achieve equality of opportunity.
The family imposes constraints on ways in which this goal can be
achieved, and the principles of justice are stated to try to take
these constraints into account. I cannot pursue these complexi-
ties here, but assume that as children we grow up in a small in-
timate group in which elders (normally parents) have a certain
moral and social authority.
2. In order for public reason to apply to the family, it must be
seen, in part at least, as a matter for political justice. It may be
thought that this is not so, that the principles of justice do not
apply to the family and hence those principles do not secure
equal justice for women and their children." This is a misconcep-
tion. It may arise as follows: the primary subject of political jus-
tice is the basic structure of society understood as the arrange-
ment of society's main institutions into a unified system of social
cooperation over time. The principles of political justice are to
apply directly to this structure, but are not to apply directly to
the internal life of the many associations within it, the family
among them. Thus, some may think that if those principles do
Rawls, A Theory of Justice §§ 70-76 (cited in note 55) (discussing the stages of moral
development and their relevance to justice as fairness).
' However, no particular form of the family (monogamous, heterosexual, or other-
wise) is required by a political conception of justice so long as the family is arranged to
fulfill these tasks effectively and doesn't run afoul of other political values. Note that this
observation sets the way in which justice as fairness deals with the question of gay and
lesbian rights and duties, and how they affect the family. If these rights and duties are
consistent with orderly family life and the education of children, they are, ceteris paribus,
fully admissible.
61 See Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family at 90-93 (cited in note 58).
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not apply directly to the internal life of families, they cannot en-
sure equal justice for wives along with their husbands.
Much the same question arises in regard to all associations,
whether they be churches or universities, professional or scien-
tific associations, business firms or labor unions. The family is
not peculiar in this respect. To illustrate: it is clear that liberal
principles of political justice do not require ecclesiastical govern-
ance to be democratic. Bishops and cardinals need not be elected;
nor need the benefits attached to a church's hierarchy of offices
satisfy a specified distributive principle, certainly not the differ-
ence principle.2 This shows how the principles of political justice
do not apply to the internal life of a church, nor is it desirable, or
consistent with liberty of conscience or freedom of association,
that they should.
On the other hand, the principles of political justice do im-
pose certain essential constraints that bear on ecclesiastical gov-
ernance. Churches cannot practice effective intolerance, since, as
the principles of justice require, public law does not recognize
heresy and apostasy as crimes, and members of churches are al-
ways at liberty to leave their faith. Thus, although the principles
of justice do not apply directly to the internal life of churches,
they do protect the rights and liberties of their members by the
constraints to which all churches and associations are subject.
This is not to deny that there are appropriate conceptions of jus-
tice that do apply directly to most if not all associations and
groups, as well as to various kinds of relationships among indi-
viduals. Yet these conceptions of justice are not political concep-
tions. In each case, what is the appropriate conception is a sepa-
rate and additional question, to be considered anew in each par-
ticular instance, given the nature and role of the relevant asso-
ciation, group, or relation.
Now consider the family. Here the idea is the same: political
principles do not apply directly to its internal life, but they do
impose essential constraints on the family as an institution and
so guarantee the basic rights and liberties, and the freedom and
opportunities, of all its members. This they do, as I have said, by
specifying the basic rights of equal citizens who are the members
of families. The family as part of the basic structure cannot vio-
late these freedoms. Since wives are equally citizens with their
husbands, they have all the same basic rights, liberties, and op-
portunities as their husbands; and this, together with the correct
' The difference principle is defined in Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 13 (cited in note
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application of the other principles of justice, suffices to secure
their equality and independence.
To put the case another way, we distinguish between the
point of view of people as citizens and their point of view as
members of families and of other associations.63 As citizens we
have reasons to impose the constraints specified by the political
principles of justice on associations; while as members of associa-
tions we have reasons for limiting those constraints so that they
leave room for a free and flourishing internal life appropriate to
the association in question. Here again we see the need for the
division of labor between different kinds of principles. We
wouldn't want political principles of justice-including principles
of distributive justice-to apply directly to the internal life of the
family.
These principles do not inform us how to raise our children,
and we are not required to treat our children in accordance with
political principles. Here those principles are out of place. Surely
parents must follow some conception of justice (or fairness) and
due respect with regard to their children, but, within certain
limits, this is not for political principles to prescribe. Clearly the
prohibition of abuse and neglect of children, and much else, will,
as constraints, be a vital part of family law. But at some point
society has to rely on the natural affection and goodwill of the
mature family members.64
Just as the principles of justice require that wives have all
the rights of citizens, the principles of justice impose constraints
on the family on behalf of children who as society's future citi-
zens have basic rights as such. A long and historic injustice to
women is that they have borne, and continue to bear, an unjust
share of the task of raising, nurturing, and caring for their chil-
dren. When they are even further disadvantaged by the laws
regulating divorce, this burden makes them highly vulnerable.
These injustices bear harshly not only on women but also on
their children; and they tend to undermine children's capacity to
acquire the political virtues required of future citizens in a viable
democratic society. Mill held that the family in his day was a
school for male despotism: it inculcated habits of thought and
ways of feeling and conduct incompatible with democracy.65 If so,
I borrow this thought from Joshua Cohen, Okin on Justice, Gender, and Family, 22
Can J Phil 263, 278 (1992).
' Michael Sandel supposes the two principles of justice as fairness to hold generally
for associations, including families. See ichael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of
Justice 30-34 (Cambridge 1982).
Mill, Subjection of Women ch 2 at 283-98 (cited in note 58).
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the principles of justice enjoining a reasonable constitutional
democratic society can plainly be invoked to reform the family.
3. More generally, when political liberalism distinguishes be-
tween political justice that applies to the basic structure and
other conceptions of justice that apply to the various associations
within that structure, it does not regard the political and the
nonpolitical domains as two separate, disconnected spaces, each
governed solely by its own distinct principles. Even if the basic
structure alone is the primary subject of justice, the principles of
justice still put essential restrictions on the family and all other
associations. The adult members of families and other associa-
tions are equal citizens first: that is their basic position. No insti-
tution or association in which they are involved can violate their
rights as citizens.
A domain so-called, or a sphere of life, is not, then, some-
thing already given apart from political conceptions of justice. A
domain is not a kind of space, or place, but rather is simply the
result, or upshot, of how the principles of political justice are ap-
plied, directly to the basic structure and indirectly to the associa-
tions within it. The principles defining the equal basic liberties
and opportunities of citizens always hold in and through all so-
called domains. The equal rights of women and the basic rights of
their children as future citizens are inalienable and protect them
wherever they are. Gender distinctions limiting those rights and
liberties are excluded.6" So the spheres of the political and the
public, of the nonpublic and the private, fall out from the content
and application of the conception of justice and its principles. If
the so-called private sphere is alleged to be a space exempt from
justice, then there is no such thing.
The basic structure is a single social system, each part of
which may influence the rest. Its basic principles of political jus-
tice specify all its main parts and its basic rights reach through-
out. The family is only one part (though a major part) of the sys-
tem that produces a social division of labor based on gender over
time. Some have argued that discrimination against women in
the marketplace is the key to the historical gendered division of
labor in the family. The resulting wage differences between the
genders make it economically sensible that mothers spend more
time with their children than fathers do. On the other hand,
some believe that the family itself is the linchpin67 of gender in-
Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 16 at 99 (cited in note 55).
This is Okin's term. See Okn, Justice, Gender, and the Family at 6, 14, 170 (cited
in note 58).
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justice. However, a liberal conception of justice may have to allow
for some traditional gendered division of labor within families-
assume, say, that this division is based on religion-provided it is
fully voluntary and does not result from or lead to injustice. To
say that this division of labor is in this case fully voluntary
means that it is adopted by people on the basis of their religion,
which from a political point of view is voluntary," and not be-
cause various other forms of discrimination elsewhere in the so-
cial system make it rational and less costly for husband and wife
to follow a gendered division of labor in the family.
Some want a society in which division of labor by gender is
reduced to a minimum. But for political liberalism, this cannot
mean that such division is forbidden. One cannot propose that
equal division of labor in the family be simply mandated, or its
absence in some way penalized at law for those who do not adopt
it. This is ruled out because the division of labor in question is
connected with basic liberties, including the freedom of religion.
Thus, to try to minimize gendered division of labor means, in po-
litical liberalism, to try to reach a social condition in which the
remaining division of labor is voluntary. This allows in principle
that considerable gendered division of labor may persist. It is
only involuntary division of labor that is to be reduced to zero.
Hence the family is a crucial case for seeing whether the sin-
gle system-the basic structure-affords equal justice to both
men and women. If the gendered division of labor in the family is
indeed fully voluntary, then there is reason to think that the sin-
gle system realizes fair equality of opportunity for both genders.
4. Since a democracy aims for full equality for all its citizens,
and so of women, it must include arrangements to achieve it. If a
basic, if not the main, cause of women's inequality is their
greater share in the bearing, nurturing, and caring for children
in the traditional division of labor within the family, steps need
to be taken either to equalize their share, or to compensate them
On this point, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture VI, § 3.2 at 221-22 (cited in
note 1). Whether it is properly voluntary, and if so, under what conditions, is a disputed
question. Briefly, the question involves the distinction between the reasonable and the
rational explained thus: an action is voluntary in one sense, but it may not be voluntary
in another. It may be voluntary in the sense of rational: doing the rational thing in the
circumstances even when these involve unfair conditions; or an action may be voluntary
in the sense of reasonable: doing the rational thing when all the surrounding conditions
are also fair. Clearly the text interprets "voluntary" in the second sense: affirming one's
religion is voluntary when all of the surrounding conditions are reasonable, or fair. In
these remarks I have assumed that the subjective conditions of voluntariness (whatever
they may be) are present and have only noted the objective ones. A full discussion would
lead us far afield.
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for it. 69 How best to do this in particular historical conditions is
not for political philosophy to decide. But a now common proposal
is that as a norm or guideline, the law should count a wife's work
in raising children (when she bears that burden as is still com-
mon) as entitling her to an equal share in the income that her
husband earns during their marriage. Should there be a divorce,
she should have an equal share in the increased value of the
family's assets during that time.
Any departure from this norm would require a special and
clear justification. It seems intolerably unjust that a husband
may depart the family taking his earning power with him and
leaving his wife and children far less advantaged than before.
Forced to fend for themselves, their economic position is often
precarious. A society that permits this does not care about
women, much less about their equality, or even about their chil-
dren, who are its future.
The crucial question may be what precisely is covered by
gender-structured institutions. How are their lines drawn? If we
say the gender system includes whatever social arrangements
adversely affect the equal basic liberties and opportunities of
women, as well as those of their children as future citizens, then
surely that system is subject to critique by the principles of jus-
tice. The question then becomes whether the fulfillment of these
principles suffices to remedy the gender system's faults. The
remedy depends in part on social theory and human psychology,
and much else. It cannot be settled by a conception of justice
alone.
In concluding these remarks on the family, I should say that
I have not tried to argue fully for particular conclusions. Rather,
to repeat, I have simply wanted to illustrate how a political con-
ception of justice and its ordering of political values apply to a
single institution of the basic structure and can cover many (if
not all) of its various aspects. As I have said, these values are
given an order within the particular political conception to which
they are attached." Among these values are the freedom and
equality of women, the equality of children as future citizens, the
freedom of religion, and finally, the value of the family in secur-
ing the orderly production and reproduction of society and of its
culture from one generation to the next. These values provide
' See Victor R. Fuchs, Women's Quest for Economic Equality (Harvard 1988). Chap-
ters 3 and 4 summarize the evidence for saying the main cause is not, as it is often said,
employer discrimination, while chapters 7 and 8 propose what is to be done.
' See § 2.3.
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public reasons for all citizens. So much is claimed not only for
justice as fairness but for any reasonable political conception.
§ 6: QUESTIONS ABOUT PUBLIC REASON
I now turn to various questions and doubts about the idea of
public reason and try to allay them.
1. First, it may be objected that the idea of public reason
would unreasonably limit the topics and considerations available
for political argument and debate, and that we should adopt in-
stead what we may call the open view with no constraints. I now
discuss two examples to rebut this objection.
(a) One reason for thinking public reason is too restrictive is
to suppose that it mistakenly tries to settle political questions in
advance. To explain this objection, let's consider the question of
school prayer. It might be thought that a liberal position on this
question would deny its admissibility in public schools. But why
so? We have to consider all the political values that can be in-
voked to settle this question and on which side the decisive rea-
sons fall. The famous debate in 1784-1785 between Patrick
Henry and James Madison over the establishment of the Angli-
can Church in Virginia and involving religion in the schools was
argued almost entirely by reference to political values alone.
Henry's argument for establishment was based on the view that:
Christian knowledge hath a natural tendency to correct the
morals of men, restrain their vices, and preserve the peace
of society, which cannot be effected without a competent
71provision for learned teachers ....
Henry did not seem to argue for Christian knowledge as good
in itself but rather as an effective way to achieve basic political
values, namely, the good and peaceable conduct of citizens. Thus,
I take him to mean by "vices," at least in part, those actions con-
trary to the political virtues found in political liberalism, 2 and
expressed by other conceptions of democracy.
Leaving aside the obvious difficulty of whether prayers can
be composed that satisfy all the needed restrictions of political
" See Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Pas-
sage of the First Amendment 139-48 (Oxford 1986). The quoted language, which appears
in id at 140, is from the preamble to the proposed "Bill Establishing a Provision for
Teachers of the Christian Religion" (1784). Note that the popular Patrick Henry also pro-
vided the most serious opposition to Jefferson's "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom"
(1779), which won out when reintroduced in the Virginia Assembly in 1786. Curry, The
First Freedoms at 146.
"For a discussion of these virtues, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture V, § 5.4 at
194-95 (cited in note 1).
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justice, Madison's objections to Henry's bill turned largely on
whether religious establishment was necessary to support or-
derly civil society. He concluded it was not. Madison's objections
depended also on the historical effects of establishment both on
society and on the integrity of religion itself. He was acquainted
with the prosperity of colonies that had no establishment, nota-
bly Pennsylvania; he cited the strength of early Christianity in
opposition to the hostile Roman Empire, and the corruption of
past establishments." With some care, many if not all of these
arguments can be expressed in terms of the political values of
public reason.
Of special interest in the example of school prayer is that it
brings out that the idea of public reason is not a view about spe-
cific political institutions or policies. Rather, it is a view about
the kind of reasons on which citizens are to rest their political
cases in making their political justifications to one another when
they support laws and policies that invoke the coercive powers of
government concerning fundamental political questions. Also of
special interest in this example is that it serves to emphasize
that the principles that support the separation of church and
state should be such that they can be affirmed by all free and
equal citizens, given the fact of reasonable pluralism.
The reasons for the separation of church and state are these,
among others: It protects religion from the state and the state
from religion; it protects citizens from their churches 4 and citi-
zens from one another. It is a mistake to say that political liber-
alism is an individualist political conception, since its aim is the
protection of the various interests in liberty, both associational
and individual. And it is also a grave error to think that the
separation of church and state is primarily for the protection of
secular culture; of course it does protect that culture, but no more
so than it protects all religions. The vitality and wide acceptance
See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance (1785), in The Mind of the Foun-
der 8-16 (Bobbs-Merrill 1973) (Marvin Meyers, ed). Paragraph 6 refers to the vigor of
early Christianity in opposition to the empire, while paragraphs 7 and 11 refer to the mu-
tually corrupting influence of past establishments on both state and religion. In the cor-
respondence between Madison and William Bradford of Pennsylvania, whom he met at
Princeton (College of New Jersey), the freedom and prosperity of Pennsylvania without
an establishment is praised and celebrated. See 1 The Papers of James Madison (Chicago
1962) (William T. Hutchinson and William M.E. Rachal, eds). See especially Madison's
letters of 1 December 1773, id at 100-01; 24 January 1774, id at 104-06; and 1 April 1774,
id at 111-13. A letter of Bradford's to Madison, 4 March 1774, refers to liberty as the
genius of Pennsylvania. Id at 109. Madison's arguments were similar to those of Toc-
queville I mention below. See also Curry, The First Freedoms at 142-48 (cited in note 71).
' It does this by protecting the freedom to change one's faith. Heresy and apostasy
are not crimes.
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of religion in America is often commented upon, as if it were a
sign of the peculiar virtue of the American people. Perhaps so,
but it may also be connected with the fact that in this country the
various religions have been protected by the First Amendment
from the state, and none has been able to dominate and suppress
the other religions by the capture and use of state power. 5 While
some have no doubt entertained that aim since the early days of
the Republic, it has not been seriously tried. Indeed, Tocqueville
thought that among the main causes of the strength of democ-
racy in this country was the separation of church and state.7 6 Po-
' What I refer to here is the fact that from the early days of the Emperor Constantine
in the fourth century Christianity punished heresy and tried to stamp out by persecution
and religious wars what it regarded as false doctrine (for example, the crusade against
the Albigenses led by Innocent I in the 13th century). To do this required the coercive
powers of the state. Instituted by Pope Gregory IX, the Inquisition was active throughout
the Wars of Religion in the 16th and 17th centuries. While most of the American Colonies
had known establishments of some kind (Congregationalist in New England, Episcopa-
lian in the South), the United States, thanks to the plurality of its religious sects and the
First Amendment which they endorsed, never did. A persecuting zeal has been the great
curse of the Christian religion. It was shared by Luther and Calvin and the Protestant
Reformers, and it was not radically changed in the Catholic Church until Vatican H. In
the Council's Declaration on Religious Freedom-Dignitatis Humanae-the Catholic
Church committed itself to the principle of religious freedom as found in a constitutional
democratic regime. It declared the ethical doctrine of religious freedom resting on the
dignity of the human person; a political doctrine with respect to the limits of government
in religious matters; a theological doctrine of the freedom of the Church in its relations to
the political and social world. All persons, whatever their faith, have the right of religious
liberty on the same terms. Declaration on Religious Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae): On
the Right of the Person and of Communities to Social and Civil Freedom in Matters Relig-
ious (1965), in Walter Abbott, S.J., ed, The Documents of Vatican 11675, 692-96 (Geoffrey
Chapman 1966). As John Courtney Murray, S.J., said: "A long-standing ambiguity had fi-
nally been cleared up. The Church does not deal with the secular order in terms of a dou-
ble standard-freedom for the Church when Catholics are in the minority, privilege for
the Church and intolerance for others when Catholics are a majority." John Courtney
Murray, S.J., Religious Freedom, in Abbott, ed, Documents of Vatican II at 672, 673. See
also the instructive discussion by Paul E. Sigmund, Catholicism and Liberal Democracy,
in R. Bruce Douglas and David Hollenbach, S.J., eds, Catholicism and Liberalism: Con-
tributions to American Public Philosophy (Cambridge 1994). See especially id at 233-39.
" Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 294-301 (Perennial Library 1988)
(J.P. Mayer, ed, George Lawrence, trans). In discussing "The Main Causes That Make
Religion Powerful in America," Tocqueville says the Catholic priests "all thought that the
main reason for the quiet sway of religion over their country was the complete separation
of church and state. I have no hesitation in stating that throughout my stay in America I
met nobody, lay or cleric, who did not agree about that." Id at 295. He continues:
There have been religions intimately linked to earthly governments, dominating
men's souls both by terror and by faith; but when a religion makes such an alliance,
I am not afraid to say that it makes the same mistake as any man might; it sacrifices
the future for the present, and by gaining a power to which it has no claim, it risks
its legitimate authority....
Hence religion cannot share the material strength of the rulers without being bur-
dened with some of the animosity roused against them.
Id at 297. He remarks that these observations apply all the more to a democratic country,
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litical liberalism agrees with many other liberal views in accept-
ing this proposition.77 Some citizens of faith have felt that this
separation is hostile to religion and have sought to change it. In
doing this I believe they fail to grasp a main cause of the
strength of religion in this country and, as Tocqueville says, seem
ready to jeopardize it for temporary gains in political power.
(b) Others may think that public reason is too restrictive be-
cause it may lead to a stand-off" and fail to bring about decisions
on disputed issues. A stand-off in some sense may indeed hap-
pen, not only in moral and political reasoning but in all forms of
reasoning, including science and common sense. Nevertheless,
this is irrelevant. The relevant comparison is to those situations
in which legislators enacting laws and judges deciding cases
must make decisions. Here some political rule of action must be
laid down and all must be able reasonably to endorse the process
by which a decision is reached. Recall that public reason sees the
office of citizen with its duty of civility as analogous to that of
judge with its duty of deciding cases. Just as judges are to decide
cases by legal grounds of precedent, recognized canons of statu-
tory interpretation, and other relevant grounds, so citizens are to
reason by public reason and to be guided by the criterion of reci-
procity, whenever constitutional essentials and matters of basic
justice are at stake.
Thus, when there seems to be a stand-off, that is, when legal
arguments seem evenly balanced on both sides, judges cannot re-
solve the case simply by appealing to their own political views.
To do that is for judges to violate their duty. The same holds with
public reason: if, when stand-offs occur, citizens simply invoke
grounding reasons of their comprehensive views,79 the principle
of reciprocity is violated. From the point of view of public reason,
citizens must vote for the ordering of political values they sin-
cerely think the most reasonable. Otherwise they fail to exercise
political power in ways that satisfy the criterion of reciprocity.
for in that case when religion seeks political power it will attach itself to a particular
party and be burdened by hostility to it. Id at 298. Referring to the cause of the decline of
religion in Europe, he concludes, "I am profoundly convinced that this accidental and par-
ticular cause is the close union of politics and religion.... European Christianity has al-
lowed itself to be intimately united with the powers of this world." Id at 300-01. Political
liberalism accepts Tocqueville's view and sees it as explaining, so far as possible, the ba-
sis of peace among comprehensive doctrines both religious and secular.
In this it agrees with Locke, Montesquieu, and Constant; Kant, Hegel, and Mill.
7 I take the term from Philip Quinn. The idea appears in Rawls, Political Liberalism,
lecture VI, § 7.1-2 at 240-41 (cited in note 1).
" I use the term "grounding reasons" since many who might appeal to these reasons
view them as the proper grounds, or the true basis-religious, philosophical, or moral-of
the ideals and principles of public reasons and political conceptions ofjustice.
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In particular, when hotly disputed questions, such as that of
abortion, arise which may lead to a stand-off between different
political conceptions, citizens must vote on the question accord-
ing to their complete ordering of political values." Indeed, this is
a normal case: unanimity of views is not to be expected. Reason-
able political conceptions of justice do not always lead to the
same conclusion;8' nor do citizens holding the same conception
always agree on particular issues. Yet the outcome of the vote, as
I said before, is to be seen as legitimate provided all government
officials, supported by other reasonable citizens, of a reasonably
just constitutional regime sincerely vote in accordance with the
idea of public reason. This doesn't mean the outcome is true or
correct, but that it is reasonable and legitimate law, binding on
citizens by the majority principle.
Some may, of course, reject a legitimate decision, as Roman
Catholics may reject a decision to grant a right to abortion. They
may present an argument in public reason for denying it and fail
to win a majority. 2 But they need not themselves exercise the
'o Some have quite naturally read the footnote in Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture
VI, § 7.2 at 243-44 (cited in note 1), as an argument for the right to abortion in the first
trimester. I do not intend it to be one. (It does express my opinion, but my opinion is not
an argument.) I was in error in leaving it in doubt whether the aim of the footnote was
only to illustrate and confirm the following statement in the text to which the footnote is
attached: "The only comprehensive doctrines that run afoul of public reason are those
that cannot support a reasonable balance [or ordering] of political values [on the issue]."
To try to explain what I meant, I used three political values (of course, there are more) for
the troubled issue of the right to abortion to which it might seem improbable that politi-
cal values could apply at all. I believe a more detailed interpretation of those values may,
when properly developed in public reason, yield a reasonable argument. I don't say the
most reasonable or decisive argument; I don't know what that would be, or even if it ex-
ists. (For an example of such a more detailed interpretation, see Judith Jarvis Thomson,
Abortion, 20 Boston Rev 11 (Summer 1995), though I would want to add several addenda
to it.) Suppose now, for purposes of illustration, that there is a reasonable argument in
public reason for the right to abortion but there is no equally reasonable balance, or or-
dering, of the political values in public reason that argues for the denial of that right.
Then in this kind of case, but only in this kind of case, does a comprehensive doctrine de-
nying the right to abortion run afoul of public reason. However, if it can satisfy the pro-
viso of the wide public reason better, or at least as well as other views, it has made its
case in public reason. Of course, a comprehensive doctrine can be unreasonable on one or
several issues without being simply unreasonable.
"Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture VI, § 7.1 at 240-41 (cited in note 1).
For such an argument, see Cardinal Joseph Bernardin, The Consistent Ethic: What
Sort of Framework?, 16 Origins 345, 347-50 (Oct 30, 1986). The idea of public order the
Cardinal presents includes these three political values: public peace, essential protections
of human rights, and the commonly accepted standards of moral behavior in a community
of law. Further, he grants that not all moral imperatives are to be translated into prohibi-
tive civil statutes and thinks it essential to the political and social order to protect human
life and basic human rights. The denial of the right to abortion he hopes to justify on the
basis of those three values. I don't of course assess his argument here, except to say it is
clearly cast in some form of public reason. Whether it is itself reasonable or not, or more
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right to abortion. They can recognize the right as belonging to le-
gitimate law enacted in accordance with legitimate political in-
stitutions and public reason, and therefore not resist it with
force. Forceful resistance is unreasonable: it would mean at-
tempting to impose by force their own comprehensive doctrine
that a majority of other citizens who follow public reason, not un-
reasonably, do not accept. Certainly Catholics may, in line with
public reason, continue to argue against the right to abortion.
Reasoning is not closed once and for all in public reason any more
than it is closed in any form of reasoning. Moreover, that the
Catholic Church's nonpublic reason requires its members to fol-
low its doctrine is perfectly consistent with their also honoring
public reason.'
I do not discuss the question of abortion in itself since my
concern is not with that question but rather to stress that politi-
cal liberalism does not hold that the ideal of public reason should
always lead to a general agreement of views, nor is it a fault that
it does not. Citizens learn and profit from debate and argument,
and when their arguments follow public reason, they instruct so-
ciety's political culture and deepen their understanding of one
another even when agreement cannot be reached.
2. Some of the considerations underlying the stand-off objec-
tion lead to a more general objection to public reason, namely,
that the content of the family of reasonable political conceptions
of justice on which it is based is itself much too narrow. This ob-
jection insists that we should always present what we think are
true or grounding reasons for our views. That is, the objection in-
sists, we are bound to express the true, or the right, as seen from
our comprehensive doctrines.
However, as I said in the Introduction, in public reason ideas
of truth or right based on comprehensive doctrines are replaced
by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as
citizens. This step is necessary to establish a basis of political
reasoning that all can share as free and equal citizens. Since we
are seeking public justifications for political and social institu-
tions-for the basic structure of a political and social world-we
reasonable than the arguments on the other side, is another matter. As with any form of
reasoning in public reason, the reasoning may be fallacious or mistaken.
' As far as I can see, this view is similar to Father John Courtney Murray's position
about the stand the Church should take in regard to contraception in We Hold These
Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition 157-58 (Sheed and Ward 1960).
See also Mario Cuomo's lecture on abortion in his Notre Dame Lecture of 1984, in More
Than Words: The Speeches of Mario Cuomo 32-51 (St Martin's 1993). I am indebted to
Leslie Griffin and Paul Weithman for discussion and clarification about points involved in
this and the preceding footnote and for acquainting me with Father Murray's view.
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think of persons as citizens. This assigns to each person the same
basic political position. In giving reasons to all citizens we don't
view persons as socially situated or otherwise rooted, that is, as
being in this or that social class, or in this or that property and
income group, or as having this or that comprehensive doctrine.
Nor are we appealing to each person's or each group's interests,
though at some point we must take these interests into account.
Rather, we think of persons as reasonable and rational, as free
and equal citizens, with the two moral powers14 and having, at
any given moment, a determinate conception of the good, which
may change over time. These features of citizens are implicit in
their taking part in a fair system of social cooperation and seek-
ing and presenting public justifications for their judgments on
fundamental political questions.
I emphasize that this idea of public reason is fully compati-
ble with the many forms of nonpublic reason.85 These belong to
the internal life of the many associations in civil society and they
are not of course all the same; different nonpublic reasons of dif-
ferent religious associations shared by their members are not
those of scientific societies. Since we seek a shareable public ba-
sis of justification for all citizens in society, giving justifications
to particular persons and groups here and there until all are cov-
ered fails to do this. To speak of all persons in society is still too
broad, unless we suppose that they are in their nature basically
the same. In political philosophy one role of ideas about our na-
ture has been to think of people in a standard, or canonical,
fashion so that they might all accept the same kind of reasons.86
In political liberalism, however, we try to avoid natural or psy-
chological views of this kind, as well as theological or secular doc-
trines. Accounts of human nature we put aside and rely on a po-
litical conception of persons as citizens instead.
3. As I have stressed throughout, it is central to political lib-
eralism that free and equal citizens affirm both a comprehensive
doctrine and a political conception. However, the relation be-
" These two powers, the capacity for a conception of justice and the capacity for a
conception of the good, are discussed in Rawls, Political Liberalism (cited in note 1). See
especially id, lecture I, § 3.2 at 19, lecture II, § 7.1 at 81, lecture I, § 3.3 at 103-04, lec-
ture IIl, § 4.1 at 108.
Id, lecture VI, § 4 at 223-27.
Sometimes the term "normalize" is used in this connection. For example, persons
have certain fundamental interests of a religious or philosophical kind; or else certain ba-
sic needs of a natural kind. Again, they may have a certain typical pattern of self-
realization. A Thomist will say that we always desire above all else, even if unknown to
ourselves, the Visio Dei; a Platonist will say we strive for a vision of the good; a Marxist
will say we aim for self-realization as species-beings.
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tween a comprehensive doctrine and its accompanying political
conception is easily misunderstood.
When political liberalism speaks of a reasonable overlapping
consensus of comprehensive doctrines, 7 it means that all of these
doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, support a political
conception of justice underwriting a constitutional democratic so-
ciety whose principles, ideals, and standards satisfy the criterion
of reciprocity. Thus, all reasonable doctrines affirm such a society
with its corresponding political institutions: equal basic rights
and liberties for all citizens, including liberty of conscience and
the freedom of religion." On the other hand, comprehensive doc-
trines that cannot support such a democratic society are not rea-
sonable. Their principles and ideals do not satisfy the criterion of
reciprocity, and in various ways they fail to establish the equal
basic liberties. As examples, consider the many fundamentalist
religious doctrines, the doctrine of the divine right of monarchs
and the various forms of aristocracy, and, not to be overlooked,
the many instances of autocracy and dictatorship.
Moreover, a true judgment in a reasonable comprehensive
doctrine never conflicts with a reasonable judgment in its related
political conception. A reasonable judgment of the political con-
ception must still be confirmed as true, or right, by the compre-
hensive doctrine. It is, of course, up to citizens themselves to af-
firm, revise, or change their comprehensive doctrines. Their doc-
trines may override or count for naught the political values of a
constitutional democratic society. But then the citizens cannot
claim that such doctrines are reasonable. Since the criterion of
reciprocity is an essential ingredient specifying public reason and
its content, political liberalism rejects as unreasonable all such
doctrines.
In a reasonable comprehensive doctrine, in particular a re-
ligious one, the ranking of values may not be what we might ex-
pect. Thus, suppose we call transcendent such values as salvation
and eternal life-the Visio Dei. This value, let's say, is higher, or
superior to, the reasonable political values of a constitutional
democratic society. These are worldly values and therefore on a
different, and as it were lower, plane than those transcendent
values. It doesn't follow, however, that these lower yet reason-
able values are overridden by the transcendent values of the re-
ligious doctrine. In fact, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is
' The idea of such a consensus is discussed at various places in Rawls, Political Lib-
eralism (cited in note 1). See especially id, lecture IV, and consult the index.
See id at xviii (paperback edition).
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one in which they are not overridden; it is the unreasonable doc-
trines in which reasonable political values are overridden. This is
a consequence of the idea of the politically reasonable as set out
in political liberalism. Recall that it was said: In endorsing a con-
stitutional democratic regime, a religious doctrine may say that
such are the limits God sets to our liberty.89
A further misunderstanding alleges that an argument in
public reason could not side with Lincoln against Douglas in
their debates of 1858.10 But why not? Certainly they were debat-
ing fundamental political principles about the rights and wrongs
of slavery. Since the rejection of slavery is a clear case of securing
the constitutional essential of the equal basic liberties, surely
Lincoln's view was reasonable (even if not the most reasonable),
while Douglas's was not. Therefore, Lincoln's view is supported
by any reasonable comprehensive doctrine. It is no surprise,
then, that his view is in line with the religious doctrines of the
Abolitionists and the Civil Rights Movement. What could be a
better example to illustrate the force of public reason in political
life?91
4. A third general objection is that the idea of public reason
is unnecessary and serves no purpose in a well established con-
stitutional democracy. Its limits and constraints are useful pri-
marily when a society is sharply divided and contains many hos-
tile religious associations and secular groups, each striving to be-
come the controlling political force. In the political societies of the
European democracies and the United States these worries, so
the objection goes, are idle.
' See § 3.2. It is sometimes asked why political liberalism puts such a high value on
political values, as if one could only do that by assessing those values in comparison with
transcendent values. But this comparison political liberalism does not make, nor does it
need to make, as is observed in the text.
On this, see Michael J. Sandel, Review of Political Liberalism, 107 Harv L Rev
1765, 1778-82 (1994), and more recently Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent:
America in Search of a Public Philosophy 21-23 (Belknap 1996).
" Perhaps some think that a political conception is not a matter of (moral) right and
wrong. If so, that is a mistake and is simply false. Political conceptions of justice are
themselves intrinsically moral ideas, as I have stressed from the outset. As such they are
a kind of normative value. On the other hand, some may think that the relevant political
conceptions are determined by how a people actually establish their existing institu-
tions-the political given, as it were, by politics. Viewed in this light, the prevalence of
slavery in 1858 implies that Lincoln's criticisms of it were moral, a matter of right and
wrong, and certainly not a matter of politics. To say that the political is determined by a
people's politics may be a possible use of the term political. But then it ceases to be a
normative idea and it is no longer part of public reason. We must hold fast to the idea of
the political as a fundamental category and covering political conceptions ofjustice as in-
trinsic moral values.
[64:765
Public Reason
However, this objection is incorrect and sociologically faulty.
For without citizens' allegiance to public reason and their hon-
oring the duty of civility, divisions and hostilities between doc-
trines are bound in time to assert themselves, should they not al-
ready exist. Harmony and concord among doctrines and a peo-
ple's affirming public reason are unhappily not a permanent con-
dition of social life. Rather, harmony and concord depend on the
vitality of the public political culture and on citizens' being de-
voted to and realizing the ideal of public reason. Citizens could
easily fall into bitterness and resentment, once they no longer see
the point of affirming an ideal of public reason and come to ig-
nore it.
To return to where we began in this Section: I do not know
how to prove that public reason is not too restrictive, or whether
its forms are properly described. I suspect it cannot be done. Yet
this is not a serious problem if, as I believe, the large majority of
cases fit the framework of public reason, and the cases that do
not fit all have special features that both enable us to understand
why they should cause difficulty and show us how to cope with
them as they arise. This prompts the general questions of
whether there are examples of important cases of constitutional
essentials and basic justice that do not fit the framework of pub-
lic reason, and if so, why they cause difficulty. In this paper I do
not pursue these questions.
§ 7: CONCLUSION
1. Throughout, I have been concerned with a torturing ques-
tion in the contemporary world, namely: Can democracy and
comprehensive doctrines, religious or nonreligious, be compati-
ble? And if so, how? At the moment a number of conflicts be-
tween religion and democracy raise this question. To answer it
political liberalism makes the distinction between a self-standing
political conception of justice and a comprehensive doctrine. A
religious doctrine resting on the authority of the Church or the
Bible is not, of course, a liberal comprehensive doctrine: its
leading religious and moral values are not those, say, of Kant or
Mill. Nevertheless, it may endorse a constitutional democratic
society and recognize its public reason. Here it is basic that pub-
lic reason is a political idea and belongs to the category of the po-
litical. Its content is given by the family of (liberal) political con-
ceptions of justice satisfying the criterion of reciprocity. It does
not trespass upon religious beliefs and injunctions insofar as
these are consistent with the essential constitutional liberties,
including the freedom of religion and liberty of conscience. There
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is, or need be, no war between religion and democracy. In this re-
spect political liberalism is sharply different from and rejects
Enlightenment Liberalism, which historically attacked orthodox
Christianity.
The conflicts between democracy and reasonable religious
doctrines and among reasonable religious doctrines themselves
are greatly mitigated and contained within the bounds of reason-
able principles of justice in a constitutional democratic society.
This mitigation is due to the idea of toleration, and I have distin-
guished between two such ideas.92 One is purely political, being
expressed in terms of the rights and duties protecting religious
liberty in accordance with a reasonable political conception of
justice." The other is not purely political but expressed from
within a religious or a nonreligious doctrine. However, a reason-
able judgment of the political conception must still be confirmed
as true, or right, by a reasonable comprehensive doctrine. 4 I as-
sume, then, that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine accepts
some form of the political argument for toleration. Of course, citi-
zens may think that the grounding reasons for toleration and for
the other elements of a constitutional democratic society are not
political but rather are to be found in their religious or nonrelig-
ious doctrines. And these reasons, they may well say, are the
true or the right reasons; and they may see the political reasons
as superficial, the grounding ones as deep. Yet there is no conflict
here, but simply concordant judgments made within political
conceptions of justice on the one hand, and within comprehensive
doctrines on the other.
There are limits, however, to reconciliation by public reason.
Three main kinds of conflicts set citizens at odds: those deriving
from irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines; those deriving from
differences in status, class position, or occupation, or from differ-
ences in ethnicity, gender, or race; and finally, those deriving
See § 3.2.
See Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture H, § 3.2-4 at 60-62 (cited in note 1). The
main points can be set out in summary fashion as follows: (1) Reasonable persons do not
all affirm the same comprehensive doctrine. This is said to be a consequence of the bur-
dens of judgment. See note 95. (2) Many reasonable doctrines are affirmed, not all of
which can be true or right (as judged from within a comprehensive doctrine). (3) It is not
unreasonable to affirm any one of the reasonable comprehensive doctrines. (4) Others
who affirm reasonable doctrines different from ours are, we grant, reasonable also, and
certainly not for that reason unreasonable. (5) In going beyond recognizing the reason-
ableness of a doctrine and affirming our belief in it, we are not being unreasonable. (6)
Reasonable persons think it unreasonable to use political power, should they possess it, to
repress other doctrines that are reasonable yet different from their own.
' See § 6.3.
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from the burdens of judgment." Political liberalism concerns
primarily the first kind of conflict. It holds that even though our
comprehensive doctrines are irreconcilable and cannot be com-
promised, nevertheless citizens who affirm reasonable doctrines
may share reasons of another kind, namely, public reasons given
in terms of political conceptions of justice. I also believe that such
a society can resolve the second kind of conflict, which deals with
conflicts between citizens' fundamental interests-political, eco-
nomic, and social. For once we accept reasonable principles of
justice and recognize them to be reasonable (even if not the most
reasonable), and know, or reasonably believe, that our political
and social institutions satisfy them, the second kind of conflict
need not arise, or arise so forcefully. Political liberalism does not
explicitly consider these conflicts but leaves them to be consid-
ered by justice as fairness, or by some other reasonable concep-
tion of political justice. Finally, conflicts arising from the burdens
of judgment always exist and limit the extent of possible agree-
ment.
2. Reasonable comprehensive doctrines do not reject the es-
sentials of a constitutional democratic polity." Moreover, reason-
able persons are characterized in two ways: First, they stand
ready to offer fair terms of social cooperation between equals,
and they abide by these terms if others do also, even should it be
to their advantage not to; 7 second, reasonable persons recognize
and accept the consequences of the burdens of judgment, which
leads to the idea of reasonable toleration in a democratic soci-
ety."8 Finally we come to the idea of legitimate law, which rea-
sonable citizens understand to apply to the general structure of
political authority.9 They know that in political life unanimity
can rarely if ever be expected, so a reasonable democratic consti-
tution must include majority or other plurality voting procedures
in order to reach decisions.' 0
The idea of the politically reasonable is sufficient unto itself
for the purposes of public reason when basic political questions
are at stake. Of course, fundamentalist religious doctrines and
" These burdens are discussed in Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture II, § 2 (cited in
note 1). Roughly, they are sources or causes of reasonable disagreement between reason-
able and rational persons. They involve balancing the weight of different kinds of evi-
dence and kinds of values, and the like, and they affect both theoretical and practical
judgments.
Id at xviii.
Id, lecture H, § 1.1 at 49-50.
Id, lecture II, §§ 2-3.4 at 54-62.
Id, lecture IV, § 1.2-3 at 135-37.
lcId, lecture X, § 2.1 at 393.
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autocratic and dictatorial rulers will reject the ideas of public
reason and deliberative democracy. They will say that democracy
leads to a culture contrary to their religion, or denies the values
that only autocratic or dictatorial rule can secure.1 1 They assert
that the religiously true, or the philosophically true, overrides
the politically reasonable. We simply say that such a doctrine is
politically unreasonable. Within political liberalism nothing more
need be said.
I noted in the beginning °2 the fact that every actual society,
however dominant and controlling its reasonable citizens may be,
will normally contain numerous unreasonable doctrines that are
not compatible with a democratic society-either certain relig-
ious doctrines, such as fundamentalist religions, or certain non-
religious (secular) doctrines, such as those of autocracy and dic-
tatorship, of which our century offers hideous examples. How far
unreasonable doctrines may be active and are to be tolerated in a
constitutional democratic regime does not present a new and dif-
ferent question, despite the fact that in this account of public
reason we have focused on the idea of the reasonable and the role
of reasonable citizens. There is not one account of toleration for
reasonable doctrines and another for unreasonable ones. Both
cases are settled by the appropriate political principles of justice
and the conduct those principles permit.0 3 Unreasonable doc-
trines are a threat to democratic institutions, since it is impossi-
ble for them to abide by a constitutional regime except as a mo-
dus vivendi. Their existence sets a limit to the aim of fully real-
izing a reasonable democratic society with its ideal of public rea-
son and the idea of legitimate law. This fact is not a defect or
failure of the idea of public reason, but rather it indicates that
there are limits to what public reason can accomplish. It does not
diminish the great value and importance of attempting to realize
that ideal to the fullest extent possible.
3. I end by pointing out the fundamental difference between
A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. The first explicitly
attempts to develop from the idea of the social contract, repre-
sented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, a theory of justice that is
no longer open to objections often thought fatal to it, and that
proves superior to the long dominant tradition of utilitarianism.
A Theory of Justice hopes to present the structural features of
" Observe that neither the religious objection to democracy nor the autocratic one
could be made by public reasoning.
'See note 3.
'See Rawls, A Theory of Justice § 35 (cited in note 55) (on toleration of the intoler-
ant); Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture V, § 6.2 at 197-99 (cited in note 1).
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such a theory so as to make it the best approximation to our con-
sidered judgments of justice and hence to give the most appro-
priate moral basis for a democratic society. Furthermore, justice
as fairness is presented there as a comprehensive liberal doctrine
(although the term "comprehensive doctrine" is not used in the
book) in which all the members of its well ordered society affirm
that same doctrine. This kind of well ordered society contradicts
the fact of reasonable pluralism and hence Political Liberalism
regards that society as impossible.
Thus, Political Liberalism considers a different question,
namely: How is it possible for those affirming a comprehensive
doctrine, religious or nonreligious, and in particular doctrines
based on religious authority, such as the Church or the Bible,
also to hold a reasonable political conception of justice that sup-
ports a constitutional democratic society? The political concep-
tions are seen as both liberal and self-standing and not as com-
prehensive, whereas the religious doctrines may be comprehen-
sive but not liberal. The two books are asymmetrical, though
both have an idea of public reason. In the first, public reason is
given by a comprehensive liberal doctrine, while in the second,
public reason is a way of reasoning about political values shared
by free and equal citizens that does not trespass on citizens' com-
prehensive doctrines so long as those doctrines are consistent
with a democratic polity. Thus, the well ordered constitutional
democratic society of Political Liberalism is one in which the
dominant and controlling citizens affirm and act from irreconcil-
able yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. These doctrines in
turn support reasonable political conceptions-although not nec-
essarily the most reasonable-which specify the basic rights, lib-
erties, and opportunities of citizens in society's basic structure.
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